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MODEST RETRIBUTIVISM 
 
Mitchell N. Berman* 
 
(March 19, 2014) 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 Michael Moore is a giant of legal philosophy.  Over the course of an academic career that 
already spans more than four decades yet shows no signs of abating, Moore has made profound 
contributions to our collective understanding of such diverse matters as moral realism and its 
implications for law, the relationship between law and psychiatry, the theory of action that undergirds 
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, the nature of legal interpretation, and, most recently, the 
metaphysics of causation. Very probably, though, Moore has achieved his greatest fame and influence 
as a theorist and proponent of a retributivist justification for criminal punishment.  
When Moore’s first papers in punishment theory appeared in the early 1980s, retributivism was 
only starting to recover from what had become, by mid-century, its near-total repudiation in respectable 
philosophical circles.  Within a generation of Moore’s arrival, however, scholars were widely 
contending—albeit more in horror than satisfaction—that retributivism had reemerged as the dominant 
account of the moral justifiability of the infliction of criminal punishment.1  Regardless of whether that is 
an accurate description of the state of theory in the early twenty-first century (and I confess to some 
skepticism), that retributivism has enjoyed a remarkable revival cannot reasonably be questioned.  Nor 
                                                          
*
 Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, and Professor of Philosophy, the University of Texas at Austin.  A distant 
predecessor to this paper was presented at the Colloquium on Moral versus Political Perspectives on the Criminal 
Law, held at Berkeley Law in October, 2013.  I am very grateful to the organizers and participants at that event for 
helpful reactions, and especially wish to acknowledge debts to Antony Duff, Alon Harel, Leora Katz, Chris Kutz, 
Sandra Marshall, Seana Shiffrin, Victor Tadros, and Arthur Yates.  I am indebted as well to: David Dolinko for 
excellent written comments on a draft; the editors of this volume, Kim Ferzan and Stephen Morse, for inviting me 
to contribute; and our honoree, Michael Moore, for all that he has taught me. 
1
 See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, “The Errors of Retributivism,” 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 124 (2000), 126. 
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can it be seriously doubted that Moore himself bears greater responsibility for the retributivist 
renaissance than does any other scholar.  Moore is the foremost living retributivist among Anglophone 
moral theorists and philosophers of law. 
My goal in this paper is to critically assess the form of retributivism that Moore has advocated, 
with rigor and acuity, and to great success.  Plausibly, and only to a first approximation, the core 
retributivist claim—the claim that distinguishes retributivist views from their nonretributivist 
alternatives—holds that it is intrinsically valuable or right to furnish wrongdoers with the negative 
consequences that they deserve.  But Moore claims much more for a wrongdoer’s negative desert than 
this.  That is, he attributes significantly greater normative force to the non-instrumental value or 
rightness of furnishing a wrongdoer with his negative desert than is necessary for a view to qualify as 
retributivist.  I will call Moore’s retributivism “robust retributivism.”  An account that resides in a nearly 
polar neighborhood of retributivist logical space may be labeled “modest retributivism.”  In this paper, I 
sketch robust and modest retributivism and aim to make the latter more eligible, principally by raising 
doubts about Moore’s arguments for each of the components that jointly comprise the former.  My 
ambition is neither to defend modest retributivism nor to defeat robust retributivism.  It is to establish 
that retributivism embraces a greater diversity of possible and even plausible views than Moore himself 
allows—including views that, in a fairly straightforward sense, are considerably more moderate than the 
version that Moore has defended. 
 
I. THE CORE OF RETRIBUTIVISM 
Any simple definition of retributivism will be contestable.  That acknowledged, it is widely 
agreed that, for a justification of punishment to qualify as retributivist, a wrongdoer’s negative desert 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2416904 
Berman, Modest Retributivism 
3 
 
must play some significant role in the justificatory account.2  Very probably, little can be said about the 
particular nature of desert’s role, or about how it figures into the logic of the justificatory argument, 
without taking sides in intra-retributivist disagreements.  Accordingly, if any claim can be fairly identified 
as core or central to retributivism, let alone definitional of it, that claim must be formulated in quite 
general or vague terms. 
Commentators reflect this point when describing retributivism as the theory, say, that 
punishment must be justified “in terms of” a wrongdoer’s negative desert.3  Yet that is perhaps a little 
too general or vague.  Consider the most commonly espoused version of a “mixed theory”—the view (to 
a first approximation) that punishment is justified if and only if it produces net good consequences and 
is not inflicted on persons who lack negative desert.4  Such a view justifies punishment by reference, in 
part, to an offender’s negative desert and therefore would count as retributivist if mere reference to 
desert were sufficient to render a justification of punishment retributivist.  And sure enough, John 
Mackie’s name for this view—“negative retributivism”5–held for some batch of years.  Increasingly, 
however, philosophers of punishment find it more accurate or illuminating to locate this position 
outside of retributivism, many preferring Antony Duff’s apt label for this view, “side-constrained 
consequentialism.”6  
Here, then, is a stab (subject to refinement) at the core retributivist thesis:  
                                                          
2
 Doug Husak makes the same observation in his contribution to this volume.  See Douglas Husak, What do 
Criminals Deserve? (this volume). 
3
 C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (New York: Clarendon, 1987), 46. 
4
 I say this is only a first approximation of the view because those who reject wholly objective conceptions of moral 
justification would likely add some sort of epistemic qualifiers, possibly at two places.  A partially subjectivized   
variant of this version of the mixed theory might maintain, for example, that punishment is justified if and only if it 
is reasonably expected to produce net good consequences and is not knowingly inflicted on persons who lack 
negative desert, or is inflicted only on persons whom the punishing authorities believe in good faith to deserve it, 
or something along these lines. 
5
 J.L. Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions,” 1 Crim. J. Ethics 3 (1982), 3. 
6
 R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford, 2001), 11. 
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(R) The goodness or rightness of satisfying a wrongdoer’s negative desert morally justifies 
the infliction of criminal punishment, without regard for any further good consequences 
that might be realized as a contingent result of satisfying the wrongdoer’s desert.7 
 
I do not claim that acceptance of (R) is definitional of any thesis properly denominated 
“retributivist.”  Still, it is highly likely that (R) is accepted by the overwhelming majority of extant views 
about punishment that are considered retributivist by their adherents and critics alike.  Importantly, (R) 
takes no position on such contested matters within the retributivist camp as what a wrongdoer’s 
negative desert consists in (e.g., suffering, or being punished),8 or whether the logical structure of the 
justification that a wrongdoer’s negative desert provides is consequentialist or deontological.  
 
II. MOOREAN RETRIBUTIVISM 
In a well-known portion of his 1984 book, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship, 
reprinted and revised as “Closet Retributivism” thirteen years later in his Placing Blame: A General 
Theory of the Criminal Law, Moore explains what retributivism is, and is not.  It is not, says Moore, any 
of several views with which it has frequently been confused.  For example, it is not lex talionis, for 
retributivists qua retributivists need not endorse any single view of the proper measure of punishment.  
It is also not “negative retributivism,” for whilst retributivists will endorse this position, one need not be 
a retributivist to do so.  “The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is 
                                                          
7
 (R) should not be taken to claim that the goodness or rightness of satisfying a wrongdoer’s negative desert 
justifies the infliction of punishment “conclusively” or “all things considered,” without regard for other 
considerations.  The form of moral justification at issue in (R) is what I call “tailored.”  I elaborate on the distinction 
in Section III.B, below.  
8
 On Feinberg’s influential triadic analysis of desert, an agent, A, deserves some treatment or state of affairs, O, on 
account of some action or property, B.  Feinberg called that which grounds a deserved treatment (B, in the 
statement above) the “desert basis.” Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970).  I call that which is deserved (O, in the statement above) the 
“desert object.” To suffer and to be punished are different desert objects if, as is widely accepted, punishment 
itself is defined in partly functional or intentional terms, say as a treatment intended to be experienced as 
disagreeable by the subject upon whom it is imposed.  See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays 
in the Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford, 1968), 4-5.  If what a wrongdoer deserves is to suffer, then his 
negative desert can be realized even if he is not punished.  What about the converse?  Is it punishment if the 
person subjected to it does not suffer?  Or, better, must punishment be designed to inflict suffering (or something 
close to it)?  People hold different views about this. 
Berman, Modest Retributivism 
5 
 
a sufficient reason to punish him,” and not only, as negative retributivism maintains, that it is a 
necessary condition.9  Similarly, retributivism is not a denunciatory theory of punishment, “should not 
be confused with a theory of formal justice (the treating of like cases alike),” and is not the view “that 
punishment of offenders satisfies the desires for vengeance of their victims, . . . [or] that the preferences 
of all citizens (not just crime victims) should be satisfied, . . . [or] that punishment is justified because 
without it vengeful citizens would take the law into their own hands.”   
Retributivism is none of these things.  Instead, it 
is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because 
and only because offenders deserve it.  Moral responsibility (“desert”) in such a view is 
not only necessary for justified punishment, it is also sufficient.  Such sufficiency of 
justification gives society more than merely a right to punish culpable offenders.  It does 
this, making it not unfair to punish them, but retributivism justifies more than this.  For 
a retributivist, the moral responsibility of an offender also gives society the duty to 
punish.  Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is true, 
we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.10 
 
I accept each and every contention in Moore’s list of “not’s.”  None of the views from which 
Moore withholds the retributivist label is equivalent to, entails, or is entailed by, (R).  But nor does the 
rejection of these several views entail the theory that Moore ends up advancing as the definition of 
retributivism.  Three features of Moore’s definition of retributivism warrant isolation and attention in 
particular.   
First, for Moore, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve does not 
justify criminal punishment only in the sense that it renders the infliction of punishment morally 
permissible. Rather, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve grounds a moral 
obligation to inflict criminal punishment.  In a footnote that follows the fourth sentence in the passage 
quoted above, Moore specifically cites K.G. Armstrong for the proposition that retributivism “only 
                                                          
9
 Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 88 (New York: Oxford, 1997), 88.  For 
simplicity, all citations to Moore’s work will be to Placing Blame alone, and not also to predecessor books and 
articles.  
10
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 91 (emphases in original; citation omitted).  
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giv[es] the state the right to punish but not the duty to do so,” but dismisses this view as yet another 
“mischaracterization of retributivism.”11  As he puts it elsewhere, while “[t]he desert of offenders 
certainly gives [state] officials permission to punish offenders, . . . retributivism goes further.  As a theory 
of a kind of justice, it obligates us to seek retribution through the punishment of the guilty.”12 
Second, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve does not merely 
justify (by making obligatory) the infliction of punishment in an individual case.  Rather, it grounds an 
obligation to establish and maintain institutions devoted to the imposition of criminal punishment.  The 
obligation to inflict retributivist punishment, says Moore, “means that officials have a duty to punish 
deserving offenders and that citizens have a duty to set up and support institutions that achieve such 
punishments.”13 
Third, it is not merely the case that the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they 
deserve, without regard for any further good consequences of doing so, is sufficient to justify the 
infliction of criminal punishment.  Rather, Moorean retributivism maintains that effectuating just 
deserts is the only goal, consideration, or rationale that can justify criminal punishment.  It is “only 
because” offenders deserve punishment that we are justified in inflicting it. 
Each of the foregoing three features stakes a position on a distinct dimension on which different 
accounts of the justifiability of punishment could plausibly vary.  Call these the dimensions, respectively, 
of force, scope, and exclusivity.  With respect to force, Moore maintains that, not only does the 
goodness or rightness of inflicting negative desert provide a reason to inflict punishment that is 
sometimes adequate to justify it all things considered, but it grounds a duty to do so as well.  With 
respect to scope, he contends that a wrongdoer’s negative desert provides an obligation, not only to 
                                                          
11
 More precisely, Moore calls Armstrong’s conception “perhaps an eighth mischaracterization of retributivism.” 
Moore, Placing Blame, at 91 n.17 (citing K.G. Armstrong, “The Retributivist Hits Back,” in H.B. Acton (ed.), The 
Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan,1969)).  It is hard to know what sense to make of that 
(uncharacteristically) fudgy “perhaps.” 
12
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 154 (emphases in original). 
13
 Id. 
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impose criminal punishment in individual cases, but to establish and maintain institutions of criminal 
punishment as well.  And with regard to exclusivity, Moore claims that furnishing negative consequences 
because they are deserved is the only morally acceptable justification for the infliction of criminal 
punishment.   
Let us call this package of views “robust retributivism.”  It is a stipulated term of art.  David 
Dolinko termed a version of retributivism that is strong on the dimension of force alone (i.e., that views 
the satisfying of negative desert not only as permissible but as obligatory) “bold” retributivism.14 Robust 
retributivism is triply bold.   
A retributivist package of views that represents a polar alternative to robust retributivism would 
differ on all three of these dimensions.  It would maintain that the value or rightness of realizing 
negative desert provides reason to punish but does not ground an obligation to punish; that 
considerations other than desert must be relied upon to justify the creation and maintenance of an 
institution of criminal punishment; and that proper recognition of the moral significance of negative 
desert does not foreclose the possibility that the act or institution of punishment could be justified on 
the strength of other values or reasons.  Call this package “modest retributivism.”  The two positions are 
summarized in the table below. 
  
                                                          
14
 David Dolinko, “Some Thoughts About Retributivism,” 101 Ethics 537 (1991), 542. 
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 Robust Retributivism Modest Retributivism 
Scope Negative desert justifies the 
institution of punishment as well as 
individual instances. 
Negative desert justifies the infliction 
of punishment on wrongdoers, but 
does not by itself justify creation and 
maintenance of the institution of 
criminal punishment. 
Force Negative desert grounds not only a 
reason to punish but a duty to punish 
as well. 
Negative desert grounds only a 
reason to punish, and not also a duty. 
Exclusivity Negative desert grounds the only 
morally acceptable justification for 
the infliction of criminal punishment. 
 
Although negative desert can justify 
the infliction of criminal punishment, 
punishment is at least potentially 
justifiable on other grounds as well. 
 
There are possible views intermediate between robust and modest retributivism.  For example, 
one could maintain that negative desert justifies the institution of punishment but is not the only 
potentially available ground for a satisfactory justification.  In focusing on the especially minimal account 
that I am calling modest retributivism, I do not intend to deny or disparage this or any other 
intermediate options.  Similarly, the dimensions of force, scope, and exclusivity are not the only 
dimensions on which versions of retributivism could differ.  I do not even claim that they are the most 
significant ones.  I claim only that they are significant enough to warrant our attention. 
 
III. LESS THAN MOORE 
 To reiterate a point made earlier, I am not setting out to show that Moorean robust 
retributivism is wrong or defective.  I aim only to show that several of the elements that comprise it are 
optional from a retributivist perspective.  Moore himself equates his version of retributivism (what I’m 
terming “robust retributivism”) with retributivism, simpliciter.  It is my impression that many people 
view things just that way.  My aim here is to raise doubts about that equation and thus to make more 
apparent other retributivist possibilities, in particular possibilities that require negative desert to do 
significantly less work than Moore demands of it. 
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 A. Force 
 In his 1993 article, Justifying Retributivism, Moore acknowledged (for the first time in print, as 
far as I’m aware) that retributivism could be a consequentialist approach to justifying punishment.  “One 
can, of course, define retributivism so that a retributivist must be a deontologist,” he remarked.  But 
that would be a mistake.  The “distinctively retributivist” thesis, he insisted—broadly in accord with 
(R)—is “that the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good.”15 
 Yet, as we have seen, Moore also contends that we have a duty or obligation both to inflict 
punishment on wrongdoers and to establish institutions whose purpose or function is to mete out 
retributive punishment.  It seems plain on the face of things that these claims go far beyond (R) or the 
view that Moore has described as “distinctively retributivist.”  Not plain, in my estimation, are the 
arguments that Moore advances for this bolder position.   
 Let us start with the dimension of force.  The usual arguments for retributivism, including those 
advanced by Moore, depend heavily upon thought experiments.16  Common are two-world 
hypotheticals: Worlds A and B are identical in all respects except that, in A, some vicious wrongdoer 
suffers or is punished on account of his wrongs, whereas in B he lives happily ever after.  If we stipulate 
that the punishment or suffering of the wrongdoer in World A does not generate any downstream 
consequences that further distinguish the two worlds, and if we think that World A is nonetheless 
better, then we have grounds to accept something like (R).  And, as Moore has further observed, your 
attachment to (R) might be strengthened by imagining that you are the wrongdoer and by then 
reflecting both on the guilt that you would yourself experience, and the judgment that you might reach 
that you too should be punished.17  If we believe that there is value in the satisfaction of negative 
desert, and if we further believe that, presumptively, we have some reason to bring about valuable 
                                                          
15
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 157. 
16
 See, e.g., John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 67. 
17
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 145-49. 
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states of affairs, then we should conclude that we have reason to promote the satisfaction of negative 
desert.   
 Notice that I have spoken so far only in terms of value and reason.  I have said nothing about 
duties, obligations, or justice, for the simple reason that nothing about hypotheticals of this kind 
naturally invites conclusions formulated in such terms.  Moore, however, maintains that we have a 
“duty” or “obligation” to satisfy negative deserts, and that such a duty or obligation is one of “justice.”   
Frankly, I am uncertain precisely what Moore means by these terms or what their normative 
upshot is.  I assume only (thanks in part to the frequent use of italics) that Moore understands and 
intends to signal a normative escalation.  On most accounts, duties and obligations are not only moral 
reasons but reasons that are particularly weighty or have second-order exclusionary characteristics, or 
are in other respects especially stringent (even if not “absolute” or “conclusive”).  I therefore interpret 
the move from normative concepts like “reason,” “right,” “permissible” and “justified” to “duty,” 
“obligation,” and “justice” to raise the stakes, so to speak.  Yet I do not see what about the thought 
experiments themselves warrants any normative escalation from claims about value and reason to 
claims about duties of justice, nor am I aware of distinct arguments that Moore provides for this move.  
We must be careful not to start by assuming that the justification for which we search will necessarily 
supply obligations and not merely reasons and permissions, or even that retributivism is a form of 
justice.  That would be to put the rabbit in the hat. 
To be sure, Moore could maintain, perhaps following Aristotle, that duty and justice are built 
into the very concept of desert.  On one such view, for example, it is a conceptual entailment of the 
proposition that A deserves O that justice demands that A get O, and we are all under a standing 
obligation to advance justice.  There are difficulties with this account of desert, for it is common, and not 
clearly mistaken, to assert in some contexts both that some A deserves φ, and that nobody is obligated 
Berman, Modest Retributivism 
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to see that A gets φ.18  But even if the contention that justice and obligation are built into the concept of 
desert can be successfully defended, it would remain for Moore to establish that the reactions that the 
retributivists’ two-world hypotheticals frequently pump go beyond judgments that it is good or right 
that the blameworthy wrongdoers at issue “suffer” (or “are punished”), and really amount to judgments 
that the wrongdoers “deserve” to suffer (or to be punished) in the particular sense of desert that entails 
that others are obligated to furnish such suffering (or punishment).19  This cannot be taken for granted. 
 B. Scope 
 So much for my doubts about the robust retributivist position on the dimension of force.  
Suppose, however, that this aspect of robust retributivism is correct even if not definitional of 
retributivism: we, or some of us, have a duty to inflict deserved suffering or deserved punishment on 
wrongdoers.  Does it follow that we have a duty to establish and maintain institutions of criminal 
punishment (still assuming that duties are especially stringent in some fashion yet to be fully 
elucidated)?  Again, it is hard to know for sure without knowing what such a duty amounts to.  But it is 
important to note that the thought experiments upon which retributivists rely do not require that 
conclusion: they are generally about individual cases.   
More significantly, the focus on individual cases appears nonaccidental once we reflect on what 
retributivist theories of punishment are (or at least can be) designed or offered to do.  Some 
commentators, perhaps influenced by Hart’s insistence on distinguishing between the “general justifying 
aim” of punishment and principles of distribution, assume that theories of punishment must be 
designed to justify the institution of criminal punishment and not just individual inflictions of 
                                                          
18
 For elaboration, see Mitchell N. Berman, “Rehabilitating Retributivism,” 32 Law & Phil. 83 (2013), 90-93. 
19
 This is an appropriate place to register my own tentative sense that prevailing views regarding the sort of thing 
that desert is might be mistaken.  Husak describes desert as a “reason-giving property.”  Husak, What Do Criminals 
Deserve? (ms. at 7).  Moore often says similar things, see Moore, Placing Blame, at 168 n.25, 178, 180, though 
elsewhere he describes desert as a “principle.”  Id. at 170, 171.  I am disposed to doubt that desert is best 
conceived as a property belonging to individuals.  But because this is not the place to elaborate on my doubts, I 
have tried in this paper to speak of desert in terms that square with common understandings and usage.  Some 
things I say in this paper—possibly including my formulation of (R)—could require restatement to accord with the 
conception of desert (negative or otherwise) that I might ultimately favor.   
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punishment.  I think this is a consequentialist bias, and that the argumentative dialectic concerning the 
justification of punishment does not require retributivists to have been arguing that the institution of 
punishment can be justified by reference to the goodness or rightness of furnishing deserved suffering.   
I have argued elsewhere that it is useful to distinguish two types of justification: all-things-
considered, and “tailored.”20  An all-things-considered justification of an act or practice is just what it 
sounds like: it purports to establish that the act or practice is morally permitted in light of all 
considerations.  A tailored justification aims to establish the permissibility of the act or practice at issue 
against one or more grounds for doubt, what I have termed “demand bases.”  It shows that the 
particular grounds explicitly invoked or implicitly relied upon for thinking the act or practice unjustifiable 
are chimerical or overridden.   
In my view, the dominant strand within punishment theory has involved the effort to provide 
tailored justifications against the particularly salient and forceful complaint that it is wrongful to 
intentionally cause people to suffer.  (R) is a promising response to this demand basis.  As such, it can be 
sensibly advanced to justify punishment in the individual case.  The argument can be construed thusly:  
assuming that there already exists an institution with lawful authority to inflict punishments (or that the 
instant case can, for whatever reason, be treated as a one-off that does not require a preexisting 
institution dedicated to the infliction of criminal punishment),21 then the fact that a person  has done 
grave wrong provides a fully sufficient reason to inflict punishment, regardless of whether punishment 
in this case would produce any of the goods, or serve any of the values that the institution was created 
to serve.   
When we turn attention to the entire institution of punishment, however, other objections—
additional demand bases—become salient, indeed inescapable.  Here are two: the institution of 
punishment consumes substantial social resources that could be put to other uses, and invariably results 
                                                          
20
 Mitchell N. Berman, “Punishment and Justification,” 118 Ethics 258 (2008), 262-66. 
21
 Think of a Nuremberg-like situation, or a domestic equivalent. 
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in the infliction of suffering on wholly innocent persons.  If I am right that these objections are squarely 
on the table in the institutional case but not necessarily in the individual case, then the contention that 
we have an obligation to establish institutions of criminal punishment solely on the strength of the value 
of realizing negative deserts seems both doubtful and unnecessary to attribute to retributivists, even 
though modest retributivists should surely believe that the noninstrumental value of satisfying negative 
deserts contributes to a successful justification of the institution.  
Some readers may feel that the account I have just offered regarding why a successful 
retributivist justification for instances of criminal punishment need not extend to or entail a successful 
retributivist justification for the institution of criminal punishment depends too heavily on a particular 
contestable account of the dialectical logic of justification.  I think, in contrast, that it accurately captures 
the truth that distinct questions are sometimes in play.  Very frequently, we ask the “what justifies 
punishment?” question when we have in mind some particular case of actual or contemplated 
punishment.  Especially when the familiar consequentialist justifications for punishment strike us as 
significantly attenuated (as when the offense charged is sufficiently unusual as to weaken the apparent 
need for general deterrence, and when the offender is sufficiently old as to weaken the need for specific 
deterrence or incapacitation), the question is posed “what reason have we to punish him?”  In such 
cases, the retributivist response  is: “because he deserves it.” That can be an acceptable answer to the 
question on the table (if perhaps a little telegraphic) even if it is not an acceptable answer to the 
broader question: “what justifies the creation and maintenance of a system of criminal punishment?”22   
                                                          
22
 Husak has recognized that these are different questions and has agreed that negative desert alone goes farther 
toward answering the former than the latter.  See Douglas Husak, “Holistic Retributivism,” 88 Cal. L. Rev.  991 
(2000), 995.  But he seems also to believe that the latter question—concerning a “complete justification for 
creating an institution of punishment,” id. at 996—is, in some meaningful sense, the real question, and therefore 
that retributivism gains greater plausibility than it genuinely warrants “only if we artificially narrow our conception 
of the nature” of the problem that we are called upon to resolve.  Id. at 993 (emphasis added).  Samuel Sheffler 
has taken issue with this suggestion of Husak’s, insisting on the independent significance of “the question of 
whether and when society’s punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual.”  
Samuel Sheffler, “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” 88 Cal. L. Rev. 965 (2000), , 987 n.73.  I’m with Sheffler on 
this point. 
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 C. Exclusivity 
 According to Moore, retributivism maintains that negative desert is a necessary and sufficient 
condition for infliction of punishment and that, equivalently, “punishment is justified if and only if the 
person or persons receiving it deserve it.” 23  Thus, he says, “retributivism asserts that punishment is 
properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it.”24  I believe this is doubly mistaken. 
Perhaps the most obvious objection would be that an offender’s negative desert does not 
constitute a sufficient condition for the justified infliction of punishment.  It is always imaginable that 
some individual act of punishment would produce horrendous consequences overall and it seems 
implausible that, even if we have moral reason, or even obligation, to inflict deserved punishment, such 
reasons or obligation are so stringent as to require that we do so regardless of the consequences.  This, 
however, is one objection I waive, for Moore has made clear, in response to Dolinko’s leveling of this 
very charge, that his invocation of sufficiency is intended to be context-sensitive: 
when we say that one condition was sufficient for another—as in the counterfactual 
statement that a particular fire was sufficient to burn down someone’s house—we 
mean that within some limited set of conditions this one by itself was sufficient.  Other 
conditions outside that set—such as the presence of oxygen in my fire example—are 
invariably necessary even while we idiomatically describe a condition within that set as 
‘sufficient’. 
 
 The retributivist’s usage of ‘sufficiency’ is to be so construed.  Within the set of 
conditions constituting intelligible reasons to punish, the retributivist asserts, desert is 
sufficient, i.e., no other of these conditions is necessary.25 
 
 Given this helpful clarification about Moore’s sufficiency claim, my two objections are these.  
First, embrace of (R) does not entail that desert is a necessary condition for the infliction of punishment.  
Second, even if negative desert is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the justified infliction of 
punishment (so long as sufficiency is construed in the somewhat loose manner just described), that does 
                                                          
23
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 92. 
24
 Id. 
25
 Id. at 173. 
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not establish that punishment may be inflicted “because and only because” the person punished 
deserves it, on the most common construal of that expression. 
1. Retributivism need not be committed to the proposition that negative desert furnishes a 
necessary condition for the justified infliction of punishment.  Let me say more about the argumentative 
dialectic that births not only retributivism but consequentialism too.  We hold out for consideration an 
actual or hypothetical act of criminal punishment and raise a moral objection: this, we say, is deeply 
morally problematic.  It is ordinarily profoundly wrongful to treat people in this way.  Therefore, if we 
are to continue to do such things, we need to explain how it can be morally justified.  Our theories of 
punishment are efforts to meet this demand.  One tradition says, in effect, we can justify doing such 
things by reference to the fact that wrongdoers deserve it.  Another tradition offers a different account: 
we can justify doing such things by the good net consequences thereby produced.  Abolitionists believe 
that both positions are wrong, and that there are no other better options waiting in the wings.  But just 
as both accounts could be wrong, both could be right.  More significantly, there is no reason why it must 
be part of either of these proposed answers to reject the other.  To be sure, one who accepts one of the 
justificatory theories could, at the same time, reject the other.  A retributivist could be an anti-
consequentialist about punishment, and a consequentialist could be an anti-retributivist.  My point is 
only that both types of theory are, by the nature of what they are asked to do, accounts about what 
does or can justify punishment; they are not accounts about what does not or cannot justify it.  
Therefore, the rejection of consequentialist justifications is no integral part of retributivism, and the 
rejection of retributivist justifications is no integral part of consequentialism.26  If this is right, Moore is 
                                                          
26
 I am speaking here of consequentialism as a justification of punishment, not as a comprehensive moral theory.  
As a comprehensive moral theory, consequentialism does deny deontological retributivism, but because we have 
already seen that consequentialist retributivism is a real possibility, it is not even true that consequentialism as a 
comprehensive moral theory entails the falsity of all varieties of retributivism. 
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simply mistaken to define retributivism as the view that “punishment is justified if and only if the person 
or persons receiving it deserve it.”27  
 Of course, even if I am right that Moore’s “necessary condition” claim attributes more content 
to retributivism simpliciter than is warranted, it could still be true that punishment is justified only when 
deserved.28  Most criminal law theorists espouse that view and they could well be correct.  If they are 
correct, however, it is on the strength of a substantive moral judgment to the effect that (to a first 
approximation) it is unjust or otherwise wrongful to inflict punishment on somebody who doesn’t 
deserve it—or, in a more subjectivist spirit, without a bona fide belief that the person is guilty and 
blameworthy.  Call that substantive moral claim (Q).  But just as consequentialists about punishment 
may help themselves to (Q) (witness “side-constrained consequentialism”), retributivists—i.e., those 
who accept (R)—are free to eschew it.  (R) does not entail (Q).  
 2.  Retributivism need not be committed to the proposition that punishment is justified only 
when inflicted “because” the person punished deserves it.  Now let us suppose, arguendo, that (R) and 
(Q) are both true.  If so, we might fairly conclude that negative desert constitutes both a sufficient and a 
necessary condition for the justified infliction of punishment (so long as sufficiency is construed in a 
sufficiently contextual or pragmatic way), which is also to say that punishment is justified if and only if 
the person punished deserves it.  Nonetheless, it would not follow that persons may be punished 
“because and only because” they deserve it, if that locution means that punishment is justified only 
when inflicted for the reason that the person punished deserves it.  Conditions need not be reasons, for 
the absence of a fact that, if present, would render some action φ impermissible, is a necessary 
condition for the permissibility of φing, but not itself a reason to φ.29  That you have not promised not to 
                                                          
27
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 91.  See also id., at 92. 
28
 Or, only when inflicted in the good faith belief that it is deserved, or something similar.  See note 4 above. 
29
 I think that the distinction between conditions and reasons lies close to the heart of the difference between 
what Dolinko calls “rational” and “moral” justification, see David Dolinko, “Retributivism, Consequentialism, and 
the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment,” 16 Law & Phil. 507 (1997), 518, and what Michael Lessnoff termed 
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quack like a duck might be a necessary condition for you to be justified in quacking but is not itself a 
reason for you to quack.  And if you do quack, it would be unnatural to say that you did so “because of” 
the fact that you had not promised not to. 
 So the fact, if true, that a person’s negative desert constitutes both a necessary condition and a 
sufficient condition for punishing him does not itself entail that we are justified in punishing somebody 
because and only because he has negative desert.  But, of course, the latter claim could nonetheless be 
true.  Are there any reasons for a retributivist (i.e., somebody who endorses (R)) to resist Moore’s 
contention that punishment is justified only when inflicted “because” the punishee deserves it? 
 Here are two.  First, one might believe, in a Kantian vein, that the value of an action depends 
upon the actor’s motivations or explanatory reasons.  Indeed, I think that Moore himself believes this.30  
Adding this view to Moore’s claim that, in order for punishment of a wrongdoer to be morally justified, 
the offender’s negative desert must supply the reason that punishment is inflicted yields a conclusion 
that a retributivist might not want to own.  Take the standard imagined case of punishment in which the 
person punished deserves it and the punishment would promote net good consequences (even putting 
aside any supposed value of realizing negative desert).  If we follow Moore (as I construe him) in 
believing that, in order for punishment in such a case to be morally justified, the offender’s negative 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
“teleological” and “entitling” justification.  Michael Lessnoff, “Two Justifications of Punishment,” 21 Phil. Q. 141 
(1971).  The distinction is also fundamental to rights-forfeiture theories of punishment.  See, e.g., Christopher 
Heath Wellman, “The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” 122 Ethics 371 (2012). 
30
 At one place, Moore comments on the “tension that exists between crime-prevention and retributive goals. . . . 
due to retributivism’s inability to share the stage with any other punishment goal.  To achieve retributive justice, 
the punishment must be inflicted because the offender did the offense.  To the extent that someone is punished 
for reasons other than that he deserves to be punished, retributive justice is not achieved.”  If “part of the reason 
motivating those who punish [a wrongdoer] is that his punishment will serve as an example to others,” he says, 
then “the criminal justice system is not achieving retributive justice.” Moore, Placing Blame, at 28.   
 Elsewhere, however, Moore writes that “the only difference” between the two most plausible versions of 
mixed theory—desert-constrained consequentialism and consequences-constrained retributivism—“is in the 
motivations of those who hold them.  And while that may make a difference in our moral judgements of those who 
hold the different branches of the mixed theory of punishment, it does not make a difference in terms of the 
actual social institutions and judgements such theories will justify.”  Id. at 94 (emphasis in original).  These 
passages strike me as inconsistent insofar as the second appears to convert a consideration that the first treats as 
bearing on act evaluations into a matter relevant only to actor evaluations.  Still, I would not be so foolhardy as to 
rule out that Moore has in mind a basis for reconciling these passages that eludes me. 
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desert must supply the reason for punishment, then the value—and possibly the justifiability—of 
punishment will depend upon the reasons that move the punishing authorities.  A retributivist could 
avoid this conclusion by refusing to join Moore in traveling from “if and only if” to “because and only 
because.” 
 Second, there is a cost to contending that punishment is justified only if imposed because—i.e., 
for the reason that—wrongdoers deserve it.  Such a claim implies that if, contrary to what the 
retributivist believes, (R) is false, then punishment is not morally justifiable: if the only reason that 
supposedly favors punishment turns out to be no reason at all, then there are no morally cognizable 
reasons to punish.  This is a steep price to pay for membership in the retributivist camp.  For myself, I 
am more confident that morally justified systems, and instances, of criminal punishment are possible 
than I am that (R) is true.   
 
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM FROM THE BACK DOOR, AGAIN 
In his well-known “argument for retributivism from the back door,” excerpted in several editions 
of the highly regarded Kadish & Schulhofer casebook,31 Moore defends the correctness of retributivism 
precisely by purporting to have shown that the only “theories of punishment truly competitive with 
retributivism, namely, the pure utilitarian theory, and the mixed theory, are each unacceptable to us.”32  
But if retributivism supplies the only acceptable justification of criminal punishment, what does it 
maintain? I have argued that retributivism is properly understood as committed to something very close 
                                                          
31
 See, for example, Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and 
Materials, 5
th
 ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989),  142-44. 
32
 Moore, Placing Blame, at 103.  Some philosophers of punishment will reject the starting assumption that 
consequentialist, retributivist, and mixed theories exhaust the possible justifications of punishment.  Additional 
possibilities would be deontological accounts that do not assume, and might even deny, that the suffering that a 
wrongdoer experiences is either good or right.  Duff’s communicative theory is plausibly one such view, as is the 
view that we act rightfully in (temporarily or permanently) removing wrongdoers from law-abiding society.  With 
many others, I am skeptical that the non-retributivist deontological positions on offer have the resources to justify 
treatment that rightly qualifies as punishment, see my “The Justification of Punishment,” in Andrei Marmor (ed.), 
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York: Routledge, 2012), 141, but we can safely table that 
question for the limited purposes of this essay. 
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to (R), and that the version of retributivism that Moore himself embraces goes significantly beyond this 
minimal content, on at least three discrete dimensions of variability.   
Have I, at the same time, done anything to bolster the prospects for retributivism of any form?  
Not directly, for I offer no new arguments for (R) itself.  Perhaps, though, my effort to identify respects 
in which Moorean retributivism goes beyond minimal retributivist commitments can serve as an indirect 
argument for modest retributivism, or something in its vicinity.  Readers who had been disposed against 
Moorean robust retributivism, but had not appreciated the availability of accounts that claim much less 
for negative desert, might now be moved to reconsider their resistance to retributivism tout court.  This 
argument, then, like Moore’s, proceeds through the back door. 
But is it a back door to the same house?  Because modest retributivism is so unbold—perhaps 
even timid or pallid?—one might wonder whether it fairly qualifies as a version of retributivism at all.33  
It is impossible to address this concern fully without wading deeply into methodological debates 
concerning the demarcation and analysis of concepts.  In concluding that what I am terming modest 
retributivism is indeed a version of retributivism, I rely heavily on my impressions of the criteria that 
criminal law theorists seem to invoke or have in mind when characterizing their own views, or even 
themselves, as retributivist or anti-retributivist.  As a descriptive matter, it appears to me that the line 
between avowed retributivists and their avowed critics is most faithfully drawn between those who 
believe and those who deny that a wrongdoer morally deserves to suffer (or to experience hardship or 
deprivation, or the like) in any sense of desert that would provide some others, including the state, with 
                                                          
33
 Duff describes “the core retributivist thought” differently than I do.  The core thought, in his view, is “that what 
gives criminal punishment its meaning and the core of its normative justification is its relationship, not to any 
contingent future benefits that it might bring, but to the past crime for which it is imposed.”  R.A. Duff, “Retrieving 
Retributivism,” in Mark D. White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy (New York: Oxford, 2011), 3.  I do 
not think that an account need view desert as supplying the “core normative justification” for punishment for it to 
qualify as retributivist. 
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reasons—nontrivial reasons, or reasons that can at least sometimes make a difference—to provide that 
suffering or deprivation.34   
(R) aims to capture the proposition that self-described retributivists overwhelmingly accept and 
that their self-described opponents overwhelmingly reject.  But the pith of retributivism could perhaps 
be put in simpler and more colloquial terms:  Ceteris paribus, the world goes better when wrongdoers 
receive their comeuppance.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Moore once opined that “[t]he true worry that most people have about retributivism” is that retributivist 
emotions, urges, and judgments are always pathological.  Moore, Placing Blame, at 119.  I take this be offered as 
an explanation for many people’s rejection of the central retributivist thesis.  My experience jibes with Moore’s 
observation. 
